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It is often thought that one of the most basic, or at least obvious, features of rationality 
is that it involves a kind of coherence. Certain patterns of attitudes do not fit together 
well, and it is a mark of the rational agent that he avoids these patterns. Plausible 
examples include akrasia (believing you ought to A, but not intending to A), means-
end incoherence (intending to E, believing that M is necessary for E, but not 
intending to M), and inconsistency (in belief, or in intention). I will call patterns of 
this sort local irrationalities: they are patterns of attitudes that irrational no matter the 
rest of your psychology. 
 On a natural picture, local irrationalities correspond to rational requirements: 
there are rational requirements against inconsistency, means-end incoherence, akrasia, 
and so on. In general, when you are locally irrational, that is because you violate a 
rational requirement.1 However, amongst those who accept this picture, there is an 
important disagreement between those who accept a Wide-Scope view of rational 
requirements, and those who accept a Narrow-Scope view. In this paper, I want to 
defend the Wide-Scope view against an important line of objection. I need to begin by 
explaining the debate. 
Rational requirements are naturally formulated as conditionals: if you believe 
that you ought to A, rationality requires that you intend to A; if you believe that p and 
believe that if p then q, rationality requires that you believe that p. However, these 
                                                
1 Broome 2005, Kolodny 2005. For alternative ways of thinking about local irrationalities, see Raz 
2005 and Kolodny 2007b. 
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claims can be understood in two ways. The Narrow-Scope view read them as their 
surface form suggests: as conditionals whose antecedent mentions an attitude or two 
(the ‘antecedent attitudes’), and whose consequent says that a further attitude (the 
‘consequent attitude’) is rationally required. So – to take the requirements that will be 
my main concern in this paper – we have: 
 
(Enkrasia-N) If you believe that you ought to A, then rationality requires that 
you intend to A.  
(Means-End-N) If you intend to E and believe that M is necessary for E, then 
rationality requires that you intend to M. 
(Closure-N) If you believe that p and believe that if p then q, then rationality 
requires that you believe q. 
 
By contrast, the Wide-Scope view hold that rational requirements are requirements to 
conform to a conditional.2 So the above requirements become: 
 
(Enkrasia-W) Rationality requires that [if you believe you ought to A, you 
intend to A]. 
(Means-End-W) Rationality requires that [if you intend to E and believe that M 
is necessary for E, you intend to M]. 
(Closure-W) Rationality requires that [if you believe that p and believe that 
if p then q, you believe q].3 
 
                                                
2 The most influential defender of the Wide-Scope view is John Broome (1999, 2005, 2007b).  
3 These statements are first approximations. For some of the required modifications, see Broome 2005. 
Following Broome, I state these requirements as if ‘rationally required’ is a propositional operator. 
However, the debate between the Wide- and Narrow-Scope views does not turn on this. 
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The Wide-Scope view is typically motivated by a problem for the Narrow-Scope 
view. Narrow-Scope requirements are susceptible to clear counter-examples. We can 
construct such examples by considering cases in which one of the antecedent attitudes 
is itself irrational. For example, consider a case in which your antecedent belief is a 
product of wishful thinking, or in which you intend to do something which is 
obviously crazy. In such a case, it is implausible that rationality requires you to have 
the consequent attitude – on the contrary, the consequent attitude would itself be 
irrational. We might also put the point this way: if you give up an irrational 
antecedent attitude and do not form the consequent attitude, it is implausible that you 
have thereby failed to do something rationality required of you.4  
 Wide-Scope requirements are not susceptible to such counter-examples. You 
comply with a Wide-Scope requirement so long as you don’t have the antecedent 
attitudes without the consequent attitude. For instance, you comply with Enkrasia-W 
so long as you don’t believe you ought to A without intending to A. Rationality 
requires you simply to avoid that combination. So Wide-Scope requirements don’t 
imply that if you have the antecedent attitudes, you are rationally required to have the 
consequent attitude. And so they don’t imply that if you have an irrational antecedent 
attitude, you are rationally required to have the consequent attitude. Nor do they 
imply that if you give up an irrational antecedent attitude, you have failed to do 
something rationality required of you. 
 The Wide-Scope view has this advantage over the Narrow because its 
requirements are symmetrical. Wide-Scope requirements do not discriminate between 
the different ways in which you might avoid irrationality. For example, you avoid 
                                                
4 For this way of putting the problem, see Brunero 2010: 35. Broome (1999) offers this sort of 
objection to the claim that you ought or have reason to comply with Narrow-Scope requirements. But 
the objection seems to me to have force against the requirements simply as stated. For argument to this 
effect, see Brunero 2010: 34-44, Hussain ms, section 4.1, and Reisner 2009: 247-8. 
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akrasia (with respect to the belief that you ought to A) if either you intend to A or if 
you do not believe you ought to A. The Wide-Scope view says that both of these 
states constitute compliance with Enkrasia-W. Parallel points hold for the other Wide-
Scope requirements. 
 The symmetry of Wide-Scope requirements is thus the main reason the Wide-
Scope view seems to be an improvement over the Narrow. Yet a number of writers 
have objected that it is also where the Wide-Scope view goes wrong. Their concern is 
that the Wide-Scope view ignores important asymmetries that the Narrow-Scope view 
captures. To get a feel for this objection, consider a case in which you are akratic – for 
some A, you believe that you ought to A but do not intend to A. Now you will 
certainly no longer be akratic if either you form the intention to A or you give up the 
belief that you ought to A. But we might feel that these responses are not on a par. We 
might want to say that forming the intention is the right way to respond to akrasia, and 
giving up the belief is the wrong way. And we might have similar thoughts about 
some of the other local irrationalities. The worry is that the symmetry of Wide-Scope 
requirements leaves no room for these thoughts. 
 The aim of this paper is to defend the Wide-Scope view against this 
asymmetry objection. I will consider two versions of the objection, one due to Mark 
Schroeder and one to Niko Kolodny.5 I will argue that while both authors draw our 
attention to a genuine asymmetry, neither shows that their asymmetry is incompatible 
with the Wide-Scope view. Once we are clear about what the Wide-Scope view is 
committed to – and, importantly, what it is not – we can see how the Wide-Scoper can 
respond to Schroeder and Kolodny’s arguments. The symmetry of Wide-Scope 
rational requirements should not lead us to reject the Wide-Scope view. 
                                                
5 Schroeder’s version of the objection is endorsed by Finlay forthcoming, section 2. Korsgaard 2009 
also offers a version of the objection, which is closer to Kolodny’s. 
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1. The Wide-Scope View 
 
I understand the Wide-Scope view to make two main claims. First, it accepts Wide-
Scope rational requirements, such as those above, which forbid local irrationalities. 
Second, it maintains that local irrationalities are irrational as such. They are not 
irrational only because they involve independently irrational attitudes. This is 
important because the Narrow-Scope view also holds that local irrationalities are 
irrational. For instance, the Narrow-Scope view holds that akrasia is irrational because 
the akratic agent lacks an intention that rationality requires. The distinctive Wide-
Scope claim is that local irrationalities are irrational even if none of the elements 
constituting them is irrational. The problem is in the combination. 
 These two claims give us a version of the Wide-Scope view that is modest, in 
at least two respects. First, the view allows that you are sometimes rationally required 
to have particular attitudes. It is quite consistent with Enkrasia-W, for instance, that 
sometimes when you believe you ought to A, you are rationally required to intend to 
A. I will assume that there are occasions on which you are so required.6 Second, the 
Wide-Scope view allows that rationality may involve more than mere compliance 
with a set of Wide-Scope requirements along the lines of those above. I will suggest 
that compliance with such requirements is at most a part of what it is to be rational. 
Being rational also involves forming, holding and revising attitudes for appropriate 
reasons. So Wide-Scope requirements must be supplemented with principles giving 
                                                
6 Brunero (2010) takes a similar line. Some Wide-Scopers are more ambitious. For example, Broome 
(2005: 323) claims that there are only ‘rare exceptions’ to the claim that ‘rational requirements 
generally have wide-scope’. The only example he gives is of the requirement not to believe 
contradictory propositions. 
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conditions under which attitudes are appropriately formed, held and revised. I will 
call such principles basing principles. 
 This point may require clarification. Parties to this debate often deny that there 
is a close connection between rationality and reasons. For instance, Kolodny writes, 
‘When we say “you ought to” in the sense of “it would be irrational of you not to,” we 
seem to be saying something about the relation between your attitudes, viewed in 
abstraction from the reasons for them’ (2005: 509, original italics). However, here 
Kolodny is talking about objective normative reasons: facts, of which an agent may 
be unaware, that favor an attitude. By contrast, my claim is that there is a connection 
between rationality and the reasons for which agents hold attitudes. These reasons are 
simply the type of thing that can figure in a certain type of explanation: ‘Lindsay 
intends to leave because the game is starting’, ‘Daniel believes he will pass because 
he believes he has a copy of the test’, and so on. It is hard to see how it could be 
denied that reasons, in this sense, are relevant to rationality.  
 Another clarification is worth making. As the two examples illustrate, 
explanations of this sort sometimes cite considerations – putative facts – and 
sometimes cite other attitudes. In the first case, we cite the consideration in light of 
which the agent believes or intends. This is sometimes called the ‘agent’s reason’ 
(Darwall 1983: 32 and passim). In the second case, we cite the psychological ground 
or basis for the belief or intention. Although these relations are closely connected, I 
take it that basing principles will be explicitly concerned with the latter. Basing 
principles specify whether an attitude, or set of attitudes, is an appropriate basis for 
another attitude. 
The two dimensions of modesty just outlined allow us to see, in outline, how 
the Wide-Scope view can respond to the asymmetry objection. The first tells us 
 7 
something about what the objection must be, if it is to be successful. The problem 
cannot simply be that there are cases in which you are rationally required to have a 
particular attitude. The Wide-Scope view can accept this. The objection must then rest 
on an asymmetry that is independent of the rational permissibility of the antecedent 
and consequent attitudes. One way this could be – and as far as I can tell the only way 
– is if there are asymmetries in the different reasons for which you might form and 
revise your attitudes so as to comply with Wide-Scope requirements. But the second 
dimension of modesty shows us how to accommodate this. Wide-Scope requirements 
are not directly concerned with basing, and so need to be supplemented with 
independent basing principles. But then we can expect those principles to explain this 
type of asymmetry.  
I now turn to Schroeder’s objection. I will argue that the strategy just outlined 
allows the Wide-Scoper to reply.7  
 
2. The Rationalization Asymmetry 
 
Here is Schroeder’s statement of the asymmetry objection, in discussing a version of 
Enkrasia-W8:  
 
The first problem for Wide-Scoping is that it is symmetric. It doesn’t distinguish between acting 
in accordance with your moral beliefs and adopting moral beliefs in accordance with your 
actions, and as a result it fails to distinguish between following your conscience and the 
distinctive vice of rationalization. Rationalization is the vice of changing your beliefs about what 
you ought to do, because you are not going to do it, anyway. According to the Wide-Scope view, 
                                                
7 John Broome independently offers a similar response to Schroeder in a draft book manuscript. 
8 For the most part, Schroeder and Kolodny focus on Enkrasia-W, and I will follow them in this 
respect. Since the sense of asymmetry is most striking in this case, we can expect objections from 
asymmetry to succeed here if anywhere.  
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this is precisely as good a way of satisfying this requirement as is actually paying attention to 
what you believe and acting accordingly. (Schroeder 2009: 227. See also 2004: 349). 
 
Schroeder’s observation is that there is an asymmetry between deciding to what to do 
on the basis of your normative beliefs and giving up those beliefs because you are not 
going to act on them.9 There is an intuitive sense in which the former is a reasonable 
way of going about things, while the latter is not. Related points can be made about 
Means-End-W. For instance, we might think it is typically reasonable to decide to 
take the means because you are going to pursue the end, but typically unreasonable to 
give up the end because you are not going to take the means. The former is part of 
what it is to be resolute, the latter is to be irresolute. Furthermore, as stated, Means-
End-W offers a third option – give up the means-end belief. And it certainly seems 
unreasonable to do that because you are not going to take the means (Schroeder 2004: 
346).10 
 It is clear that these are basing asymmetries: asymmetries in the reasons for 
which you could form and revise your attitudes so as to comply with rational 
requirements. Schroeder’s argument is therefore vulnerable to the strategy outlined. 
The Wide-Scoper can explain the asymmetries by appealing to independent basing 
principles. In this section I develop a reply of this kind. 
 It will be helpful to begin by clarifying the asymmetry at issue. To follow your 
conscience is to form and sustain your intentions in light of your beliefs about what 
you ought to do.11 Conscience-following is thus a relation between attitudes – a 
normative belief and an intention. By contrast, rationalization, in Schroeder’s 
                                                
9 Schroeder says ‘moral beliefs’, but the heart of the worry applies more generally.  
10 Note though that not all versions of the Wide-Scope view offer this option in the means-end case 
(Way 2010). 
11 Talk of ‘conscience-following’ is most natural if the beliefs in question are moral. But since the 
problem is more general, I shall adopt an artificially broad use of this expression. 
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description, involves dropping a normative belief because you are not going to act on 
it. At this level of description, this is a relation between a belief and a putative fact, 
rather than a relation between attitudes. But I take it that rationalization will at least 
involve a relation between attitudes. It involves dropping the belief that you ought to 
A on the basis of the belief that you will not A. In what follows, I understand 
rationalization in this way. 
 Thus understood, Schroeder’s observation is that there is an asymmetry 
between two psychological relations, each of which ensures conformity with 
Enkrasia-W. The question is why this is supposed to be a problem for the Wide-Scope 
view. Schroeder says that ‘[a]ccording to the Wide-Scope view, [rationalization] is 
precisely as good a way of satisfying [Enkrasia-W] as is actually paying attention to 
what you believe and acting accordingly’ (2009: 227). The thought seems to be that 
since the Wide-Scoper holds that conscience-following is reasonable because it brings 
you to comply with Enkrasia-W, he must take rationalization to be reasonable too, 
since that also brings you to comply with Enkrasia-W.  
This is a tempting line of thought, but it should be resisted. The Wide-Scoper 
need not hold that conscience-following is reasonable just because it brings you to 
comply with Enkrasia-W. More generally, Wide-Scopers can reject the implicit 
suggestion that mere compliance with Wide-Scope rational requirements is sufficient 
for rationality. The Wide-Scope view can allow that rationality also requires you to 
form and sustain your attitudes in the right sort of way, where this is specified by 
independent basing principles. If conscience-following involves appropriate basing, 
while rationalization does not, these principles will help explain why one, but not the 
other, is typically reasonable. 
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There are independent grounds for thinking that we need basing principles. If 
you have an attitude, we can ask at least two things. We can ask whether it is rational 
to have that attitude, and we can ask whether you are rational in having that attitude. 
These things can come apart. Even if it is rational to believe that p, you are not 
rational in holding this belief if it is a product of wishful thinking, or an obvious 
fallacy. Rationally holding an attitude is not simply a matter of having an attitude it is 
rational to hold. Rational requirements must be supplemented by basing principles.  
Once such principles are accepted, it is very plausible that they will explain 
the rationalization asymmetry. For the problem with rationalization is a basing 
problem. What makes rationalization unreasonable is that it involves giving up a 
belief for the wrong sort of reasons.12 And part of what makes conscience-following 
reasonable is that it involves forming an intention on an appropriate basis. A full 
explanation of this would require a general account of when a mental state is an 
appropriate basis for forming or revising an attitude. But it is very plausible that any 
adequate account will imply that normative beliefs are the right sort of basis for 
intention, whereas predictive beliefs are not the right sort of basis for dropping 
normative beliefs. 
This suffices to counter Schroeder’s objection. But the case can be bolstered if 
we briefly consider what plausible basing principles might look like. I will note two 
kinds of account. The first understands appropriate basing in terms of preservation of 
correctness, by analogy with the way in which valid arguments preserve truth. On this 
kind of account, an attitude is an appropriate basis for another attitude only if, 
necessarily, if the former attitude is correct, the latter is, too.13 What constitutes 
                                                
12 Thus, rationalization is problematic even in cases in which you ought to give up the relevant belief. 
Even if you ought to stop believing that you ought to A, something will be going wrong if you stop 
believing that you ought to A because you are not going to A. 
13 For something like this, see Wedgwood 2007: chap 4. 
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correctness will depend on the attitude in question. But if we assume that beliefs are 
correct only if true, that intending to A is correct if you ought to A, and that it is 
sometimes incorrect to drop a true belief, then conscience-following is correctness-
preserving, but rationalization is not. For if you correctly believe you ought to A, it 
will be true that you ought to A, and so correct to intend to A. And since you do not 
always do what you ought, it can be correct to believe that you will not A, but 
incorrect to drop the belief that you ought to A. So this account allows that 
conscience-following involves appropriate basing, and implies that rationalization 
does not. 
A second kind of account ties appropriate basing to normative reasons. This is 
a natural thought. Although an agent’s reasons for believing or intending are not 
necessarily normative reasons, it is plausible that they are good reasons only if they 
are – or if true would be – normative reasons. This suggests an account of basing on 
which a belief is an appropriate basis for another attitude only if its content, if true, 
would be a normative reason for that attitude. And a belief is an appropriate basis for 
dropping an attitude only if its content, if true, would be a normative reason against 
that attitude. Rationalization fails the latter condition, since the fact that you will not 
A is typically not a reason not to intend to A. Conscience-following meets the former, 
if the fact that you ought to A is a reason to intend to A. 
So there are different basing principles that the Wide-Scope view might appeal 
to in explaining the rationalization asymmetry. But to repeat, the Wide-Scoper need 
not take a stand on which basing principles are correct, in order to distinguish 
between conscience-following and rationalization. The key move is to reject the 
assumption that mere compliance with Wide-Scope rational requirements is sufficient 
for rationality. Once this move is made, it is very plausible that the rationalization 
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asymmetry will be explained by the correct basing principles, whatever they turn out 
to be. 
 
2.1. Collapse Problems 
 
Before moving on, it is worth addressing a worry one might have about the strategy 
pursued here. The strategy has been to appeal to principles independent of the Wide-
Scope view to explain the rationalization asymmetry. Schroeder discusses a reply of 
this sort. The version he considers holds that ‘though changing [your] beliefs is not 
ruled out by [Enkrasia-W], it is ruled out by some other principle governing 
theoretical reason, which says not to change your beliefs about what you ought to do, 
or some such thing’ (2009: 227, italics deleted). He objects that such principles 
threaten to collapse the Wide-Scope view into the Narrow. For if you believe you 
ought to A, then the only way to comply with both Enkrasia-W and the requirement 
not to change your belief is to intend to A. It seems to follow that you are rationally 
required to intend to A. But that is just the Narrow-Scope requirement that Enkrasia-
W was supposed to replace.14 
 The strategy outlined here avoids this problem. Rationality requires you not to 
form and revise your attitudes on inappropriate grounds. For instance, rationality 
requires you not to drop the belief that you ought to A on the basis of believing you 
will not A. But it is possible to comply with this and with Enkrasia-W without 
intending to A. So we cannot infer that you are rationally required to intend to A. 
 However, we might think that the Wide-Scope view collapses in a different 
way. If basing principles help explain what is reasonable about conscience-following 
                                                
14 Schroeder 2009: 227. See also Finlay forthcoming, section 2. And see Broome (2007a: 17-18) for 
doubts about the inference this argument relies on. 
 13 
and unreasonable about rationalization, we might wonder what role Wide-Scope 
requirements themselves play. It might seem that the present attempt to defend Wide-
Scope requirements leaves them redundant. But that is not so. While basing principles 
help explain what is reasonable about following your conscience, they do not tell us 
that it is irrational not to follow your conscience. Akrasia need not involve an attitude 
held on an inappropriate basis – it need not be a basing problem. And yet something 
has gone wrong with the akratic agent. That is just what Enkrasia-W tells us – that the 
akratic agent violates a rational requirement. The same goes for the other local 
irrationalities, and the corresponding Wide-Scope requirements. This means that 
Wide-Scope requirements are importantly asymmetrical: you are necessarily 
irrational if you violate a requirement, but not necessarily rational if you comply with 
a requirement. It is because of this that the Wide-Scope view can accommodate the 
rationalization asymmetry.15 
 
3. The Reasoning Test 
 
Niko Kolodny recognizes that mere compliance with Wide-Scope requirements is not 
sufficient for rationality: 
 
We judge that a person is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the state he is in at a given 
time, but also in virtue of how he transitions from one state to another over time. A bolt of 
lightning might jolt me out of a state in which I have two inconsistent beliefs and into a state in 
which I lack one or both of them. Although this process might be said to take me from an 
irrational state to a rational one, it would not, itself, be rational. By contrast, it would be rational 
                                                
15 Of course, the Narrow-Scope view also tells us that the akratic agent is irrational. The advantage of 
the Wide-Scope view is then just that it does not have the implausible consequences of the Narrow-
Scope view. This, of course, is just the standard argument for the Wide-Scope view, rehearsed at the 
start of this paper. 
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of me to revise one or both of these beliefs in light of the evidence against them. In other words, 
one is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the attitudes that one has at any given moment, 
but also in virtue of how one forms, retains, and revises one’s attitudes over time. (2005: 517) 
 
Kolodny’s point is about the processes by which we form and revise our attitudes 
over time. But he might have made the same point about the reasons for which we 
hold attitudes at a time. You might be less than fully rational in having attitudes that 
violate no Wide-Scope requirement, if those attitudes are held for bad, or no, reasons. 
Wide-Scope requirements must be supplemented with basing principles. 
I have argued that acknowledging this point allows the Wide-Scoper to 
accommodate the rationalization asymmetry. But Kolodny argues that there is a 
problem for the Wide-Scoper here. For Kolodny holds that the Wide-Scope view 
cannot accept an important connection between the attitudes we are rationally 
required to have, and the processes by which we form and revise our attitudes. This 
connection is stated in Kolodny’s Reasoning Test: 
 
You are rationally required (either not to have A, or not to have B) only if, from a 
state in which you have conflicting attitudes A and B, (i) you can reason from 
having A to dropping B and (ii) you can reason from having B to dropping A. 
(cf. Kolodny 2005: 521).16 
 
As stated, the Reasoning Test only applies to rational requirements governing 
conflicting attitudes. It does not apply to requirements governing local irrationalities 
                                                
16 Kolodny’s statement of the test requires you to be able to reason ‘from the content of A to dropping 
B’ (2005: 521, my italics). As Hussain ms, section 4.2 observes, Kolodny’s notion of reasoning ‘from 
the content’ raises certain difficulties. For present purposes, these difficulties are not crucial: the 
argument only requires that reasoning must begin from an attitude, and not the lack of an attitude. 
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involving the lack of an attitude. But Kolodny intends the test to apply to such 
requirements, and it is easily modified to do so: 
 
You are rationally required to (have B, if you have A) only if, from an irrational 
state in which you have A but not B, (i) you can reason from having A to 
forming B and (ii) you can reason from not having B to dropping A. 
 
So modified the test makes trouble for Wide-Scope requirements such as Enkrasia-
W.17 Reasoning is a process of ‘acquiring, retaining and revising attitudes on the basis 
of the contents of other attitudes’ (2005: 520). Reasoning must therefore begin from 
an attitude. It cannot begin from the mere lack of an attitude: you cannot reason from 
not having attitude B to dropping attitude A. (You can reason from the belief that you 
lack an attitude, but Kolodny’s test requires more than this). It follows that there 
cannot be rational requirements of the form of Enkrasia-W. 
 
3.1. Against the Reasoning Test 
 
I will argue that the Wide-Scoper should reject the Reasoning Test. I will begin by 
showing why the Wide-Scoper should reject Kolodny’s argument for the Reasoning 
Test. The same point will show that the Wide-Scoper should reject the test itself. 
Kolodny argument for the Reasoning Test begins with the Rational Response 
Test: 
 
                                                
17 As formulated, the Reasoning Test only applies to requirements governing a single antecedent 
attitude. But a variant of the test seems to rule out requirements involving more antecedent attitudes, 
such as Means-End-W and Closure-W. 
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You are rationally required (either not to have A, or not to have B) only if (i) 
you can rationally resolve the conflict of having A and B by dropping B and (ii) 
you can rationally resolve it by dropping A. (cf. Kolodny 2005: 520). 
 
Kolodny holds that rationally resolving an irrational state must involve reasoning, in 
the above sense (2005: 520). So it follows from the Rational Response Test that you 
must be able to rationally resolve the conflict of having A and B, by (i) reasoning to 
dropping B and (ii) reasoning to dropping A. However, since the state of having A 
and B is a local irrationality, we cannot assume any other attitudes you might have. So 
there must be starting points for these processes of reasoning within the irrational 
state itself. That is, it must be possible to reason from having A to dropping B, and 
from having B to dropping A. So the Rational Response Test implies the Reasoning 
Test. 
 However, the Wide-Scoper should resist this argument at its first step. For the 
Rational Response Test is in tension with the now familiar point that basing bears on 
rationality. An attitude can be rational in virtue of its basing even if it is an element of 
a local irrationality. For instance, you might be entirely rational in believing that you 
ought to A – indeed, you might know that you ought to A – even while you are akratic 
with respect to this belief. (The problem with local irrationality is in the combination). 
This means that the Rational Response Test requires you to be able to rationally drop 
even rational attitudes – even, for instance, beliefs that amount to knowledge. And 
this is surely too demanding. It cannot be a requirement on rationally holding an 
attitude that you be able to rationally drop that attitude. 
 The same kind of consideration applies directly to the Reasoning Test. If it 
need not generally be possible to rationally drop each of the attitudes involved in a 
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local irrationality, it need not be possible to do so by reasoning – let alone by 
reasoning on the basis of the states that constitute the local irrationality. The 
Reasoning Test should be rejected.18 
 
3.2. State-Requirements and Process-Requirements 
 
The discussion so far takes no account of Kolodny’s distinction between state- and 
process-requirements. But it might be thought that if rational requirements are 
process-requirements, the Reasoning Test cannot be rejected so quickly. If this were 
so, we would only have a defence of Wide-Scope state-requirements. But I will argue 
that it is not so. The above argument goes through whether rational requirements are 
state- or process-requirements.   
Kolodny introduces the state/process distinction by observing that rationality has a 
dynamic element. Rationality does not only require us to have coherent attitudes at a 
time. It also requires us to rationally form and revise attitudes over time. Therefore: 
 
We should…distinguish between ‘state-requirements’, which simply ban states in which one 
has conflicting attitudes, and ‘process requirements’, which say how, going forward, one is to 
form, retain, or revise one’s attitudes so as to avoid or escape such conflicting states. (2005: 
517). 
 
As I have been interpreting them, Wide-Scope requirements are state-requirements. 
Enkrasia-W, for instance, tells you not to be in the state of believing that you ought to 
                                                
18 It might be thought that this response gives rise to another version of the Collapse problem (2.1). For 
if your antecedent attitude is rational, and you have no way of dropping this attitude by reasoning, then 
the only way forward is to form the consequent attitude. And this may be thought to imply that the 
consequent attitude is rationally required. However, this would show only that Narrow-Scope 
requirements apply when the antecedent attitudes are rational (and cannot be rationally dropped). But 
this is not implausible in the way that unqualified Narrow-Scope requirements are. 
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A while not intending to A. It does not tell you how, going forward, to form, retain, or 
revise your attitudes. So if rational requirements are process-requirements, they must 
be reformulated. Kolodny suggests that Enkrasia-W might become: 
 
(Enkrasia-WP1)  If you believe that you ought to A but do not intend to A, then 
you are rationally required to either (i) form the intention to A 
on the basis of your belief that you ought to A or (ii) give up 
the belief that you ought to A on the basis of your lack of an 
intention to A. (cf. Kolodny 2007a: 373). 
 
Enkrasia-WP1 suggests a new argument for something like the Reasoning Test. For it 
is plausible that Enkrasia-WP1 is a genuine requirement only if it is possible to do 
what (ii) says. 
 However, it is not clear why Wide-Scopers should accept Enkrasia-WP1 as the 
reformulation of Enkrasia-W. Process-requirements are concerned with the attitudes 
to form or revise going forward – they are diachronic, rather than synchronic. But 
Enkrasia-WP1 not only calls for you to form or revise attitudes, but to do so on a 
particular basis. It is not clear why process-requirements must be this specific. If the 
point is simply to call for a response, there is a much simpler way to reformulate 
Enkrasia-W: 
 
(Enkrasia-WP2)  If you believe that you ought to A but do not intend to A, then 
you are rationally required to either (i) form the intention to A 
or (ii) drop the belief that you ought to A. 
 
 19 
And if this is the correct formulation, it is unclear why it must always be possible to 
drop the antecedent belief by reasoning. Indeed, the same considerations raised in the 
last section apply. If your antecedent belief is rational, then you may have no other 
attitudes which allow you to rationally drop this belief. Enkrasia-WP2 gives no 
support to the Reasoning Test. 
 Kolodny’s arguments that rational requirements are process-requirements do 
not favor Enkrasia-WP1 over Enkrasia-WP2. These arguments turn on the idea that 
rational requirements are normative: ‘the very idea of a state-requirement is 
questionable. If rational requirements are normative, deontic, or response guiding, 
then they call for the subject to respond in a certain way (2005: 517). Again, ‘some 
requirements of rationality are normative or deontic…they can function as advice or 
guide your deliberation…state-requirements are not normative, in this sense, since 
they do not tell you to do anything’ (2007a: 371-2). However, both Enkrasia-WP1 and 
Enkrasia-WP2 are normative, in this sense: both call for you to respond in a certain 
way.19, 20 
Furthermore, there are independent grounds for preferring Enkrasia-WP2 to 
Enkrasia-WP1. The latter implies that you fail to do something rationality requires if, 
when you believe you ought to A, you form the intention to A on the basis of 
something other than this belief. But this seems unnecessarily restrictive. Suppose that 
you form the intention to A on the basis of belief in considerations that are reasons to 
                                                
19 Kolodny does briefly consider requirements along the lines of Enkrasia-WP2. He objects that these 
would be requirements to ‘avoid or escape [an irrational state] in any way one likes’ (2005: 517. cf. 
also 2007a: 372). But this seems to me a mistake. As we saw in section 2, independent basing 
principles may constrain the rational ways to escape a local irrationality.  
20 Some might worry that there is no significant distinction between Enkrasia-WP2 and Enkrasia-W. 
After all, since Enkrasia-W applies at all times, it implies that: if at time t you believe you ought to A 
but do not intend to A, then at t1 you are rationally required to either intend to A or not believe that you 
ought to A. We might think that there is little difference between this and Enkrasia-WP2 (cf. Reisner 
2009). However, if there is no significant distinction between Enkrasia-W and Enkrasia-WP2, the 
Wide-Scoper can reject Kolodny’s claim that Enkrasia-W is not response-guiding, since Enkrasia-WP2 
is clearly response-guiding. 
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A, or on the basis of intending to A and believing that Bing is a good way to A. It 
seems like you might be rational in forming your intention in this way, even if you 
also believe that you ought to A. If so, that is another reason for the Wide-Scoper to 
prefer Enkrasia-WP2 to Enkrasia-WP1. 
I conclude that Wide-Scopers can accept that rational requirements are 
process-requirements and still reject the Reasoning Test. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I have discussed two types of asymmetry and argued that neither grounds a 
compelling argument against the Wide-Scope view. A modest version of the Wide-
Scope view – one that allows that particular attitudes can be rationally required, and 
that rationality involves forming, holding and revising attitudes for appropriate 
reasons – can accommodate the asymmetries. Of course, this does not amount to a 
complete defense of the Wide-Scope view. There may be other compelling objections 
to Wide-Scope requirements, and it may be that their work can be done by other 
principles. I am here agnostic about this. But whatever else is wrong with the Wide-
Scope view, it is not the symmetry of its rational requirements.21, 22 
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